climate goals and responsibilities
Climate change involves many loci of decision and thus responsibility, from the ordinary individual to nation states to the 'global planner'. My research considers how these various decisions are best modeled in order to illuminate relevant policy debates affecting both present and future generations. [This work is supported by the Climate Ethics and Future Generations project, on which I am a co-investigator, funded by The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences.]
Work in progress
Work in progress
- The implicit commitments of the Ramsey equation for the social discount rate in cost-benefit analysis [working draft pending]
- 'International Paretianism' and the question of ‘feasible’ climate solutions in Philosophy and Climate Change
forthcoming. Budolfson, M., McPherson, T. and Plunkett, D. (eds.) Oxford University Press. - Making Climate Decisions: Climate Policy and Decision-Making
(with Bradley, R. ) 2015. Philosophy Compass 10, 799–810
- The scientist qua policy advisor makes value judgments
2012. Philosophy of Science 79, 893–904 - Uses and Misuses of Multicriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) in Environmental Decision Making
(with Carmel, Y., Cross, J., Wilcox, C. ) 2009. Risk Analysis 29, 26–33 - Right Decisions or Happy Decision‐makers?
(with Regan, H.M., Colyvan, M., Burgman, M.A. ) 2007. Social Epistemology 21, 349–368 - The precautionary principle: a new approach to public decision-making?
2006. Law, Probability and Risk 5, 19–31
uncertainty in belief and decision
Rational belief involves neither overstating nor understating one's uncertainty about the truth on various matters, given the evidence at one's disposal. Rational choice involves due caution regarding what options are choice-worthy, given the uncertainty in one's beliefs and values regarding the consequences of alternative options. My research explores how these maxims ought to be substantiated, given diverse evidential and choice situations. [This work is supported by the Ethics and Risk grant, on which I am a Chief Investigator, funded by the Australian Research Council; and by my ANU Futures Scheme Grant.]
Work in progress
Work in progress
- Belief revision under growing awareness (joint work with H. O. Stefansson) - proposes constraints on belief change when one becomes aware of new possibilities that one had not previously anticipated [working draft]
- Model-Selection Theory: The Need for a More Nuanced Picture of Use-Novelty and Double-Counting
(with Werndl, C. ) 2018. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69(2), 351–375 - The problem of evaluating automated large-scale evidence aggregators
(with Wüthrich, N. ) 2017. Synthese, online 28 November 2017 - The Diversity of Model Tuning Practices in Climate Science
(with Charlotte Werndl) 2016. Philosophy of Science 83(5), 1133–1144 - Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation
(with Bradley, S. ) 2014. Erkenntnis 79, 1287–1303 - Persistent Experimenters, Stopping Rules, and Statistical Inference
2013. Erkenntnis 78, 937–961 - Climate Models, Calibration, and Confirmation
(with Werndl, C. ) 2013. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64, 609–635 - Testimony as Evidence: More Problems for Linear Pooling
2012. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41, 983–999
- Can free evidence be bad? Value of information for the imprecise probabilist
(with Bradley, S. ) 2016. Philosophy of Science 83, 1–28 - Should Subject Probabilities Be Sharp?
(with Bradley, S. ) 2014. Episteme 11, 277–289 - Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation
(with Bradley, S. ) 2014. Erkenntnis 79, 1287–1303 - What are the minimal requirements of rational choice? Arguments from the sequential-decision setting
2010. Theory and Decision 68, 463–487 - Distinguishing indeterminate belief from “risk-averse” preferences
2007. Synthese 158, 189–205
ethics and decision theory
Differing ethical theories prescribe differing constraints on decision-makers regarding what options are choice-worthy and what evidence is worth pursuing. My research investigates these respective sets of constraints, shedding light on decision theory and ethical theories alike. [This work is supported by the Ethics and Risk grant, on which I am a Chief Investigator, funded by the Australian Research Council; and by the Humanising Machine Intelligence project funded by the ANU.]
Work in progress
Work in progress
- The real paradox of supererogation - explores the status of supererogatory acts, arguing that only in a limited sense may an act be morally permissible and yet not morally best [working draft pending]
- Crime, punishment and inadequate evidence - proposes a novel explanation for why some bodies of evidence, despite conferring high probability of guilt, are inadequate for conviction in legal trials (joint work with M. Colvyan) [working draft pending]
- Modelling the moral dimension of decisions
(with Colyvan, M., Cox, D. ) 2010. Noûs 44, 503–529
counterfactual & causal reasoning
Counterfactuals are crucial for explicating notions of causation, but the communication of causal concepts is also crucial for understanding counterfactual reasoning. Or at least this is the position defended in my research (in collaboration with Alex Sandgren); our account of the semantics and pragmatics of counterfactuals appeals to the various scientific (causal) claims that speakers may communicate via counterfactual statements. [This work is supported by my ANU Futures Scheme Grant.]
Work in progress
Work in progress
- Levelling counterfactual scepticism (joint work with A. Sandgren) - argues against counterfactual scepticism in proposing that the meaning of counterfactual statements depends on the domain or level of scientific inquiry that is invoked [working draft]